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Less than eight years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court
began its explorations of the links between psychiatric
testimony, the right to counsel, and the applicability
of the doctrine in Miranda v. Arizona to cases involving mentally disabled individuals. See generally
Perlin, "The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled
Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random
Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or 'Doctrinal
Abyss?,'" 29 Ai:iz. L. Rev. 1 (1987) (hereinafter
"Symbolic Values"). Beginning with its decision in
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), the Court has
taken up at least a dozen cases involving mentally
disabled criminal defendants, mostly in contexts involving the role and weight of expert testimony (e.g.,
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Jones v.
U.S., 463 U.S. 354 (1983); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470
U.S. 68 (1985)), the privilege against self-incrimination, focusing on the interplay between Miranda and
mental disability (e.g., Estelle v. Smith; Wainwright
v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986); Allen v. Illinois,
478 U.S. 364 (1986); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527,
106 S. Ct. 2678 (1986); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
157 (1987)); and competence to be executed (Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Penry v. Lynaugh,
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988)).
For a complex combination of reasons, see "Symbolic Values," supra at 3, the Court has remained
irresistibly drawn to these issues. Even more recently,
it has decided two additional cases-Buchanan v.
Kentucky, 483 U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 2906 (1987); and
Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1792
*Professor Perlin is Director of New York Law School's Federal Litigation Clinic. He wishes to acknowledge the invaluable research assistance
of Susan Sheppard.
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( 1988 )-both of which deal with prosecutorial use at
trial or sentencing of statements made by criminal
defendants to psychiatrists while institutionalized,
and which, when read together help clarify how seriously the Rehnquist Court takes the 1981 Estelle
decision, and what its significant values are in cases
involving putatively mentally disabled criminal defendants.

Baclcground: Estelle v. Smith
In Estelle, the Supreme Court reversed a death
sentence that seemed to flow from expert testimony
by the now well-known Dr. Grigson that the defendant was a "remorse[less]" and a "very severe sociopath." Estelle, 45 l U.S. at 459-60. Dr. Grigson's
opinion followed an evaluation of the defendant
(made at the court's request) about which defense
counsel had "inexplicably" never been notified. Smith
v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647, 651 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd,
602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 451 U.S. 454
(1981).
In its opinion, the Supreme Court found both a
Fifth Amendment Miranda violation (finding the
privilege against self-incrimination applicable to the
penalty phase of a death case, and holding that a
defendant-who.. neither initiated a psychiatric examination nor attempted to introduce any psychiatric
evidence-may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements could be used against him
at a capital sentencing proceeding), Estelle, 451 U.S.
at 461-68, and a Sixth Amendment violation_ as well
(ruling that the defendant's right to counsel was violated by the state's failure tQ notify the defendant's
lawyer of the pretrial psychiatric evaluation), id. at
469-72.
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Estelle wa~ hailed by scholars and commentators
as a "fertile source of criminal defense litigation,"
and as a recognition that psychiatrists may not nec~ssarily have a "benevolent purpose" in cases where
such mental health professionals become an "arm of
t~e prosecutor." Note, 10 Amer. J. Crim. L. 65, 78
( 1982 ); Note, "Estelle v. Smith and Psychiatric Testimony: New Limits on Predicting Future Dangerousness," 33 Baylor L. Rev. 1015, 1033 (1981); Note,
"The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Psychiatric
ExaminatjQ11s: Implications of Estelle v. Smith, " 50
~--de():,-:wa~h.
~~v. 275, 303 (1982).
1
foterestingly, however, it was generally construed
fairlj;nwrq"!lY.;i!.1 ~ater lower federal court cases, and
was ofohnguished in c;as1s where defendants had
sop,ght, cq01ppe11.ry/~X'?miqations, where they raised
~nfahrlltyfdgtiJ.ses~."ano='in-a'civil case where a prison
adjustment committee imposed disciplinary sanctions
on a prisoner for his refusal to participate in a screening interview with a psychologist. See, e.g., Shelby v.
Shu/sen, 600 F. Supp. 432, 435-36 (D. Utah 1984)
(competency evaluation; Estelle distinguished); (but
see Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (9th
Cir. 1986)(competency examination "critical stage"
under Estelle)); Sturgis, 796 F.2d at 108 (insanity
defense; Es_telle distinguished); Watters v. Hubbard,
72U'.2d 381, 384 (6th Cir. 1984) (accord); U.S. v.
Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1109-11 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(~calia, J.)(accord); (but see id. at 1137, 1147-50 (Ba. zel~n, ,J., dissenting)); Taylor v. Best, 746 F:2d 220,
24~-24 (4th Cir. 1984) (screening' interview; Estelle
distinguish~d ). Such decisions appeared to bear out
Professor Slobogin's cautious concern over what he
had predicted would be Estelle's "limited applicability." Slobogin, "Estelle v. Smith: The Constitutional
~ontour~ of the Forensic Evaluation," 31 Emory L.J.
71, 76 ( 1982); see generally "Symbolic Values," supra
at 6~-64. The decisiop still remained, however, "the
Burger Court's· highwater Miranda mark." Id. at 80.
After it handed down Estelle, the Supreme Court
remained largely silent for the next six years as to the
potential future contours of its doctrine. Then it decided, within a year, Buchanan and Satterwhite, in an
attempt to answer two of the many unanswered s.ub~tantive and procedural questions left in Estelle's aftermath: whether, when defense counsel seeks an
evaluation for the· purposes of pretrial treatment, a
statement to ~ii examining psychiatrist can be used
at trial on issues of dangerousness or to rebut a mental
status defense, and, when there is an Estelle violation,
whether the "harmless eqor" doctrine applies?

defense of "extreme emotional disturbance" by having a social worker read .from psychological evaluations that had been prepared following earlier,
unrelated juvenile arrests. According to reports, defendant was an "isolated '[individual], mistrustful of
others and interpersonally deficient," displaying "fiat
affect" and a "mild thought disorder," exhibiting
"extremely simplistic and very concrete thinking"
and "very ·poor" impulse controls, and appearing to
_ be "a very dependent, immature, probably pretty severely emotionally disturbed, and very easily confused
youth," with the "potential for developing a full
blown schizophrenic disorder," id. at 2910-11 n.9.
On.cross-examination, the prosecutor attempted to
rebut this defense by having the witness read from
another evaluation prepared by another mental health
professional (Dr. Lange) following a joint motion by
counsel to seek a determination as to whether the
defendant should appropriately receive psychiatric
treatment while awaiting trial in the current proceedings. Id. at 2911. According to Dr. Lange, the defendant was a "fairly sophisticated youth who would
be capable of manipulative conning type behaviors."
Id. n.10.
The court noted that, while Dr. Lange also expressed his views on the defendant's competency to
stand trial, that was not the purpose· of liis evaluation;
rat~er, the motion was filed "to enable [the] defendant to receive psychiatric treatment." Id. n.11.
When defense counsel objected that this evaluation
had nothing to do with his emotional disturbance
defense (but only with his competency to stand trial,
an issue defendant had never raised), id. at 2911-12,
the court allowed an edited version to be read to the
jury, reasoning, "You can't argue about his mental
status at the time of the commitment of this offense
and exclude evidence when he was evaluated with
reference to that mental status," id. at 2912.
After the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the
defendant's non-capital conviction (on the theory that
he had "opened the door" to the introduction of Dr.
Lange's report by introducing the earlier reports, Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 691S.W.2d210, 213 (Ky.
1985), and that the use of the report did not violate
the Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v. Smith}, the
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.
First, Justice Blackmun, writing for a six-Justice
majority, distinguished Estelle, since, in that case, t~e
defendant had neither raised a mental state defense
nor offered psychiatric evidence at trial. Buchanan,
107 S. Ct. at 2917, discussing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 46566. Here, since the defendant requested a psychiatric
evaluation and presented some psychiatric evidence
(on the issue of an extreme emotional disturbance
defense), "at the very least, the prosecution may rebut

i.

Buchanan v. Kentucky
In Buchanan, the defendant, in a non-capital homicide trial, had attempted to establish an affirmative
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examination without lingering fears that the content
of liis discussions with the examiner, or the exam~
iner's impressions of his current mental status, will
be used against him at trial.

this presentation with the reports of the examination
that the defendant requested. " Buchanan, 107 S. Ct.
at 2918.
Under such circumstances, the Fifth Amendment
would not apply. Id., citing, inter alia, Byers, 740
F.2d at 1111-13. Estelle was further distinguishable
since ( 1) Buchanan's lawyer joined in the motion for
Dr. Lange's examination, and (2) the "entire defense
strategy" was to establish the defendant's "extreme
emotional disturbance. " Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at
2918.
Second, the Court further rejected the defendant's
Sixth Amendment Estelle argument; since defense
counsel requested Dr. Lange's examination, "It can
be assumed-and there are no allegations to the contrary-that defense counsel consulted with the [defendant] about the nature of the examination." Id.
See Estelle, 451 U.S. at 469-71. It similarly rejected
defendant's argument that he could not have anticipated that the requested evaluation might be used to
undermine his "mental status" defense; under Estelle,
the Court reasoned, counsel was "certainly on notice
that if . . . he intended to put on a 'mental status'
defense ... , he would have to anticipate the use of
psychological evidence by the prosecution in rebuttal." Buchanan: 107 S. Ct. at 2919.
The Court finally concluded that, if there were any
constitutional error,.it was "harmless in the circumstances of this case," id. n.21, since defendant had
failed, under Kentucky law, to show provocation, an
additional element of the extreme emotional disturbance defense, independent of defendant's mental status, id.
Justice Marshall's dissent (on this issue, for himself
and Justice Brennan; Justice Stevens joined the dissent
on an unrelated issue) focused on the "fundamental
distinction" between an examination for the purposes
of assessing defendant's then-current amenability to
involuntary hospitalization and treatment, and one
for assessing his prior m~ntal condition at the time
of the offense. Id. at 2919, 2922 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The examination request stemmed from
"humanitarian and therapeutic concerns unrelated to
the prosecution," id. at 2923, and these concerns could
only be satisfied if there were "unimpeded establishment of relations of trust and cooperation among the
physician, the [state], and the potential patient," id.
He added:

Id. (footnote omitted).
The state would remain free, Justice Marshall
noted, to seek a separate examination specifically as
to the defendant's mental condition at the tiPie of the
offense. Id n.5. He emphasized that there was no
suggestion here that defendant "exploited" examination procedures to "manufacture evidence" so as
to be able to proffer a mental status defense, noting
that the reports on which the defendant relied had
been prepared at the state's request before the occurrence of the crime for which the defendant was being
charged. This sequence, in liis view, was suffi.Cient to
counter any suggestion that the evidence of defendant's emoti~nal disturbance was "a product of selfserving origin. " Id.
While it was possible (but unlikely) tpat the state
intended to offer the defendant the possiDility of pretrial hospital treatment only on the condition that.he
waive objections to the admission of inculpatory statements or impressions made dunng the evaluation, "it
could not be assumed that either [defendant] or his
attorney knew of this condition when joining a request
for the examination." Id. at 2923 (emphasis in original).
Since Estelle did not hold that the contents of any
report could be admitted as rebuttal evidence on the
mental status 'issue, defendant's request was "materially uninformed, as was his consultation with counsel," thus, in Justice Marshall's view, violating the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id. at 2923-24.
Justice Marshall also specifically rejected what he
read as the majority's suggestion that, where a de-
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These concerns apply with full force to the mentally ill criminal defendant, and in this context require
the trus~ and cooperation of the defendant's attorney
1
as well. If the purposes of the mvoluntary hospitalization and treatment provisions are to be attained,
and examinations are to be accurate and treatments
effective, the defendant must feel free to request an
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----- Ct. at 1796. See generally Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24 ( 1967).
On appeal, Justice 0 'Connor expressed the view of
a majority on the Court that the admi~ion of Dr.
Grigson's testimony did violate the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 1797. (Justice Marshall filed a separate
opinion, concurring in part and concurring in judgment, on behalf of himself, Justice Brennan, and, in
part, Justice Blackmun; Justice Blackmun filed a brief
opinion, concurring in part and concurring in judgment; Justice Kennedy did not participate in the case.)
Because the defendant was indicted, arraigned and
had counsel appointed all before Dr. Grigson's examina,tion, if was "clear" that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsei attached. Id. at 1796-97.
The majority further rejected the state's argument
that other motions and orders filed with the Court
provided defense counsel with sufficient notice that a
"future dangerousness" examination would take
place. First, there was an unresolved factual dispute
as to the applicability and timing of some of the filings
in question. See id. at 1796, and id. n.2. Second, even
if all filings had been made in a timely manner, they
would not have "adequately notif[ ied] " defense counsel as to Dr. Grigson's ensuing examination. Third,
there was no support for a "constructive notice" theory (based on the placement of the state's motions
and certain ex parte orders in the file) urged by the
state. Id. at 1797.
Moving on to the harmless error issue, the Court
found that while a Sixth Amendment violation that
"pervade[ d] the entire proceeding," could "never '·1
be considered harmless, the effect of this error was
simply limited to the admission of Dr. Grigson's testimony. Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. at 1797 (citing, inter
a/ia, Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.9; Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1975)). Furthermore, a reviewing court would be in a position to "make an
inteiligent judgment about whether the_ erroneous admission of psychiatric t~stimony might have affected
a capital sentencing jury." Id. at 1798. Thus, the
harmless error doctrine would apply to Estelle-type
Sixth Amendment' violations. Id. Interestingly, the
Court noted, on lhis point, that it had applied the
harmless error doctrine to a psychological evaluation
question in Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2919 n.21.
Under the circumstances of this case, however, the
Court found the error not to be harmless, because the
state had failed to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained." Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. at 1798,
quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. Dr. Grigson's testimony "[stood] out," the majority noted, because of
his qualifications (he was the only "licensed physician" to take the stand, Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. at

fondant places his mental status in issue by relying
on reports that do not address his trial competency,
"he should expect that the results of his competency
examination may be used by the prosecutor in rebuttal." Id. at 2924 n.6. Such an expectation would
be contrary to "the integrity of the clinical endeavor
[which] requires the creation and maintenance of relations among the prosecution, defense, examiner, and
defendant that are as open and cooperative as possible." Id.
Satterwhite v. Texas
In an even more recent case, the Court was faced
with a fact situation much closer to the one in Estelle,
and one that involved the same witness, Dr. James
P. Grigson. In Satterwhite, after the defendant was
charged with a capital murder offense (but before
. indictment or the appointment of counsel), the state
requested (and was granted) a psychological evaluation (by Dr. Schroeder, a psychologist) as to the
defendant's competency to stand trial, his responsibility at the time of the offense and his future dangernusness. Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. at 1795.
After indictment and appointment of counsel, the
state successfully sought a second evaluation (by Dr.
Holbrook, a psychiatrist) on the same topics; defense
counsel was not notified of this examination, ei'ther.
About one month later, Dr. Grigson submitted a letter
to the ttjal court, reporting that he had evaluated the
defendant in jail, and that defendant had "a severe
antisocial personality disorder and [was] extremely
dangerous and will s;ommit future acts of violence,"
id. at 1795. Remarkably, there was some dispute as
to exactly what precipitated this evaluation, since the
record revealed no court order so authorizing Dr.
Grigson to do such an evaluation.
The dekndant was convicted of capital murder.
Satterwhite v. State, 726 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986). At the penalty phase, Dr. Grigson testified,
pursuant to Texas law, see Tex. Crim. Proc. Code
Ann .. § 37.071 ( 1988 Supp.), that the defendant presented a "continuing threat to society through acts
of criminal violence," Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. at 1795.
And the defendant was sentenced to death.
On direct appeal, while the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals agreed that the admission of Dr. Grigson's
testimony violated Estelle, it found the error to be
harmless as an average jury would still have found
that the appropriately-admitted evidence was a sufficient basis upon which to sentence the defendant to
death. Satterwhite, 726 S.W.2d at 92-93. The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the "harmless error" doctrine applied to Estelle Sixth Amendment violations, Satterwhite, 108 S.
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Id. at 1802.
Because of the "confluence" of factors-likelihood
of prejudice, difficulty in assessing degree or'prejudice,
and heightened concern for reliability in capital
cases-he was thus convinced that admission in violation of Estelle of a psychiatric examination that
leads to testimony at a capital sentencing "may never
be considered harmless error." Id. at 1802-03.
He further found the Court's reliance on Buchanan
unpersuasive. As Buchanan was prosecuted.for a noncapital offense, any indication in that opinion that the
harmless error doctrine might apply in illegal admission of psychological testimony cases thus had "little
relevance in the present context." Id. at 1803 n.3.
Justice Blackmun wrote separately, both to indicate
his agreement with Justice Marshall that harmless
error analysis was inappropriate in an Estelle Sixth
Amendment context, and to note that the problem
with which the Court was faced was "particularly
acute where, under a system such as that of Texas,
the jury must answer the very question the psychiatrist purports to answer." Id. at 1803 (Blackmuii, i.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
He concluded:

1199 ), and the "powerful- content of his message"
( Grigson had stated "unequivocably" that the defendant would pose a "continuing threat" to society,
that he had a "lack of conscience," that he was "as
severe a sociopath as you can be," that on a one-toten scale of sociopathy, he was a "ten plus," and that
he was "beyond the reach of psychiatric rehabilitation," id. ), a message highlighted by the district attorney in his closing argument. See id.:
[Dr. Grigson] tells you that on a range from 1 to
10 he's ten plus. Severe sociopath. Extremely dangerous. A continuing threat to society. Can it be

cured? Well, it's not a disease. It's not an illness.
That's his personality. That's John T. Satterwhite.
Grigson's findings were "critical" to the death sentence, and the Court, finding it impossible to say
beyond a reasonable doubt that the testimony did not
influence the jury, concluded that the error was thus
not harmless. Id.
In a separate opinion, Justice Marshall agreed that
admission of Dr. Grigson's testimony was a "bald
violation" of Estelle, and that the defendant's death
sentence should thus be vacated. Id. at 1799 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). He wrote separately, however, to stress two
points: (J) the Court should be "especially hesitant
to ever apply harmless error analysis to capital cases,"
id., and (2) even if the harmless error doctrine were
ever appropriate in capital cases generally, it was inappropriate in cases showing Sixth Amendment Estelle errors. Id. at 1801 (Justice Blackmun joined in
this aspect of his opinion only).
First, the Estelle Court "gave no hint" that such
an analysis could ever apply to the admission of psychiatric testimony in capital sentencing proceedings
where there was a Sixth Amendment violation, id.;
The potential prejudice is "so high" where the testimony is generally of "critical importance" to the
sentencing determination, and where it is "clothed
with a scientific authority that often carries great
weight with lay juries." Id. On this point, Justice
Marshall cited his majority opinion in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 ( 1985), recognizing the "pivotal role" psychiatry plays in criminal proceedings.
Second, Justice Marshall found it "difficult, if not
impossible, to accurately measure the degree of prejudice" arising from a failure to notify defense counsel
in such a case, Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. at 1801 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment):
Divining the effect of psychiatric testimony on a
sentencer's determination whether death is an appropriate sentence is thus more in the province of
soothsayers than appellate judges.

I am fortified in this conclusion by my continuing
concern-wholly apart from the testimony of the ubiquitous Doctor Grigson in Texas capital cases - about

the reliability of psychiatric testimony as to a defendant's future dangerousness (wrong two times out
of three). See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916
(1983) (dissenting opinion).
Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. at 1803 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (emphasis added).

Impact of Buchanan and Satterwh'ite?
When read together, Buchanan and Satterwhite reveal some backsliding from the Estelle position, but
also appear to clarify that the Rehnquist Court is not
ready to abandon that doctrine in toto.
The Estelle violation in Satterwhite was a cle_ar one;
the Court's opinion needs to be read more as a reflection of its post-Barefoot desire to treat death penalty cases procedurally more like non-capital cases
than as a separate category. See "Symboijc Values,"
supra at 4 (discussing Supreme Court's "obsessiveness
with narrowing the universe of potential new issues
which could be raised in death penalty appeals")
(emphasis in original).
While the Satterwhite majority suggests that a reviewing court can make an "intelligent judgment" as
to whether inappropriately admitted testimony unconstitutionally taints a subsequent verdict, it does
not respond directly to Justice Marshall's fears that
the patina of scientific authority given to such testi77
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mony may carry dispositive weight with lay jurors,
Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. at 1798. Interestingly, the majority does focus on the stature of Dr. Grigson's credentials ("the only licensed physician to take the
stand"). Id. at 1799. See also id.: "He informed the
jury of his educational background and- experience,
which included teaching psychiatry at a Dallas medical school and practicing psychiatry for over 12
years."
On the other hand, the Buchanan opinion is more
problematic for at least two separate reasons. First,
it appears to indicate that the Supreme Court is as
confused as others as to the different types of potential
mental status examinations, and the significant temporal differences in these evaluations. See Buchanan,
107 S. Ct. at 2919, 2922 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
While defense counsel did join in the request for Dr.
Lange's examination, it appears clear that this was
conceived of as a means of seeking pretrial hospitalization for his client, not as an attempt to "sandbag"
the state (by creating "self-serving" testimony as to
his history of "extreme emotional disturbance"). Id.
at 2919, 2923 n:5 EMarshall, J., dissenting); compare
id. at 2919 n.21 (defendant argued to Supreme Court
that affirmance might cause future defense counsel to
"sandbag" the court by wait!ng until after trial to
raise the competency to stand trial question) (majority opinion).
This leads to a more troubling inquiry: has the
Supreme Court created yet another "incredible dilemma" for mentally disabled defendants? See Perlin,
"Another 'Incredible Dilemma': Psychiatric Assistance and Self-Incrimination," [ 1985-86] ABA Preview, No. 10 (March 14, 1986); see generally Smith
v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 106 S. Ct. 2678 (1986). If
they are to exercise their statutory right to seek hospital treatment awaiting trial, are they sacrificing their
right to coun~el and their privilege against self-incrimination in the ensuing criminal trial? See, e.g.,
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 202A.070(5) ( 1977), discussed in
Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2911 n.11. While this concern
is raised in Justice Marshall's dissent, id. at 2923, it
is not squarely dealt with in the majority opinion.
Thus, the majority suggests that, given its opinion in
Estelle, counsel was "certainly on notice" that if he
intended to raise a "mental status" defense, he would
have to anticipate testimonial rebuttal. Id. at 2919.

While that suggestion certainly does comport w~th
Smith as to the mental status defense, it is not on
point on the question of ameliorative pretrial hospitalization, which the majority conceded was the purpose of defense counsel's motion. Id. at 2911 n.11.
This issue is largely independent of the Estelle concerns (and is irrelevant to the fact pattern in Satterwhite where counsel had never received notice of the
examination at all). Yet, it remains an important one.
If counsel respond to Buchanan by advising clients
not to seek such ameliorative treatment (so as to avoid
the possibility of an over-inclusive examination such
as the one apparently done by Dr. Lange), then the
state statutory scheme becomes only hortatory.
Are there other links between Satterwhite and Buchanan? When read together, they should probably
also be considered in the context of two other Supreme
Court doctrines: its watered-down "reasonable effectiveness of counsel" standard as enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and its
procedural default doctrine set out in Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 ( 1977}. These cases make it fairly
clear that the Supreme Court will be loath to tamper
with a jury verdict when the complained-of error appears to fie, to almost any appreciable extent, the
result of counsel's decision making. Tfms, it refused
to reverse in Buchanan (where counsel allegedly
should have been able to anticipate what might have
happened once he "opened the door") but did so in
Satterwhite (where counsel had no way of knowing
what was transpiring). This gloss gives life to two
Supreme Court policies: not inquiring into counsel
competency, but also not sanctioning abusive use of
mental health testimony by the state in the crimillal
process (as reflected first in Estelle).
Conclusion
While there has not yet been any com~entary or
significant follow-up litigation on Satterwhite or on
this aspect of Buchanan, it is likely that both will be
considered carefully in the future. The two cases show
that the Supreme Court is still like a moth drawn to
a flame, fascinated by cases involving mentally disabled criminal defendants. The Court's fascination
shows no sign o'f ebbing. No doubt cases offering
further refinement ofthese issues will emerge in coming Supreme Court Terms.

SUPREME COURT LINEUP
all of the individuals whose t~tfmony would support
defendant's alibi amount to ineffective assistance? 01~on_ v. U.S., No. 88-62, seeking review of 846 F.2d
_1103 (7th Cir. 1988), which refused to question counsel's choice of defense strategy.

Certiorari Denied
The Supreme Court denied review in the following
cases:
• Effective assistance. Will a defense attorney's rejection of an alibi defense strategy before talking to

.
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